Housing Market(s) of San Diego

Landvoigt, Piazzesi, Schneider (2015, AER)

January 29, 2021

Motivations

During the 2000-2005 housing boom, there were large differences in capital gains across houses within San Diego county.

Repeat sales 2000 - 2005; San Diego County, CA



How to understand the cross section of capital gains during the boom?

- Which houses are in the market (house quality)
- What kind of people choose to move (age, income, wealth)
- Availability of cheap credit

Relax credit constraints \Rightarrow Poor households benefit more \Rightarrow Prices of the low end houses rise more

What They Do

An assignment model with a continuum of houses and heterogeneous agents:

- Movers' demand for housing quality derived from a life-cycle problem with credit market frictions
- Equilibrium house prices adjust to assign houses differ by quality to households differ by age, income and wealth
- Quantify the model with micro data on San Diego county during 2000s boom
- Use 2000 price distribution as quality index
- Completely segmented markets by quality
- No supply side of housing: only have realized distribution of houses transacted

Contributions

New Evidence on <u>Cross Section</u> of Capital Gains and Trading Volume by Quality

- Contribute to the study of house trading volume (Stein 1995)
- Comparing house price dynamics across price segments within a metro area (Poterba 1991, Case and Mayer 1996, Case and Shiller 2005, Guerrieri, Hartley and Hurst 2013)

Richer Model

 An assignment model with a continuum of houses and a multidimensional distribution of mover characteristics (Caplin and Leahy 2010, Stein 1995, Ortalo-Magne and Rady 2006, Rios-Rull and Sanchez-Marcos 2008)

Contributions

Jointly Consider Credit Constraints and Changes in House Quality

- Credit matters for prices (Lamont and Stein 1999, Mian and Sufi 2009, Mian and Sufi 2010)
- Quality matters for prices (Poterba 1991, Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan 2007, Guerrieri, Hartley and Hurst 2013)

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Outline

Facts

Data Cross Section of House Prices and Qualities Mover Characteristics

Model

Setup Calibration Estimate Price and House Service Flow

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Results

Data

House prices and market volume:

- All deeds written in San Diego county 1997-2008 (Trulia.com)
- Drop all data except for single-family dwellings

Mover characteristics:

2000 Census: count of all housing units; 5% survey sample of households (25,000) containing household income, age of the head, housing tenure. age of dwelling, whether moved in recently

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- For owner-occupied dwellings: house value and mortgage payment
- 2005 American Community Survey (ACS): 6,500 representative households

Price as Quality Index

If there is a one-dimensional quality index that household care about, then house quality at any point in time is reflected one-for-one in the house price \Rightarrow Use 2000 house price as quality index

Assume quality of any single house doesn't change over given period \Rightarrow Houses with same (2000) quality should appreciate the same amount over the same period

This implies we could get 2005 quality distribution from 2000 quality/price distribution

Price Change by Quality

$$\log p_{t+1}^i - \log p_t^i = a_t + b_t \log p_t^i + \varepsilon_{t+1}^i$$

Fit 70, 315 repeated sales during 1997-2008 at the dwelling level to the second equation below (GMM) $\,$

$$\log p_{t+k}^i - \log p_t^i = a_{t,t+k} + b_{t,t+k} \, \log p_t^i + \varepsilon_{t,t+k}^i$$

TABLE 1: ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS FROM REPEAT SALES MODEL FOR SAN DIEGO

Year	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
a_t	$\begin{array}{c} 0.76 \\ (0.04) \end{array}$	$1.29 \\ (0.04)$	$1.41 \\ (0.04)$	$1.30 \\ (0.04)$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.87 \\ (0.05) \end{array}$	$0.60 \\ (0.06)$	$-0.56 \\ (0.07)$	$-1.09 \\ (0.10)$	-3.18 (0.12)
b_t	$-0.05 \\ (0.003)$	-0.093 (0.003)	$-0.10 \\ (0.003)$	$-0.09 \\ (0.003)$	$-0.05 \\ (0.004)$	$-0.04 \\ (0.004)$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.04 \\ (0.01) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.07 \\ (0.01) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.22 \\ (0.01) \end{array}$
σ_t^i	8.8	8.3	8.6	8.2	8.0	8.4	9.7	11.4	13.8

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Imply 2005 Quality Distribution

•
$$a_{0,5} = 4.75$$
, $b_{0,5} = -.322$

Predicted log price for 2005:

$$\log \hat{p}_5 = a_{0,5} + (1 + b_{0,5}) \log p_0$$

In this way, a one-to-one mapping between 2005 price and quality (i.e. 2000 price) is constructed, which could be used to induce 2005 house quality distribution:

$$G_t(p_0) = \Phi_t(a_{0,5} + (1 + b_{0,5})\log p_0)$$

where Φ_t is calculated directly from 2005 ACS data

Quality Distribution: 2000, 2005



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Mover Characteristics

TABLE 2: CHARACTERISTICS OF SAN DIEGO MOVERS AND STAYERS

	Year 2000		Year	2005	
	Movers	Stayers	Movers	Stayers	
Fraction of households					
aged ≤ 35 years	0.34	0.13	0.46	0.14	
aged > 35 years	0.66	0.87	0.54	0.86	
Median Income (in thousands)					
aged ≤ 35 years	74.1	74.8	77.5	86.7	
aged > 35 years	82.3	74.4	88.7	78.5	
Median Wealth (in thousands)					
aged ≤ 35 years	145. 0	161.2	222.3	257.0	
aged > 35 years	361.4	402.2	603.3	724.7	

Model Setup: Preferences

- Households live for at most T periods and die at random: D_t
- *D_t* independent over time but has an age-dependent probability.
- Preference defined over housing service streams s, numeraire consumption goods c, amount of consumption w left as bequest in the period of death

Conditional on period τ , utility for an age a_{τ} agent is

$$E_{\tau} \left[\sum_{t=\tau}^{\tau+T-a_{\tau}} \beta^{t} \left[(1-D_{t}) \ u(c_{t}, s_{t}(h_{t})) + (D_{t}-D_{t-1}) \ v^{b}(w_{t}) \right] \right]$$

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Model Setup: Assets -Houses and Bonds

Houses:

- Differ by quality $h \in [0,1]$ that trade at price $p_t(h)$
- ► No renting, only owning house could generate housing service
- A house with quality h_t produces a period t service flow $s_t(h_t)$

Bonds:

Between period t and t + 1, agent either lend at rate R_t, or borrow at rate R_t + ρ_t, with ρ_t > 0

• Denote net borrowing as b_t , the **borrowing constraint** is

$$b_t \le (1 - \delta_t) p_t(h_t).$$

where δ_t downpayment requirement on a house.

Model Setup: Market Frictions and Exogenous Shocks

Houses:

- Transaction cost ν proportional to the value of the house
- Maintenance cost ψ every period

In addition, there is a moving shock $m_t \in \{0,1\}$, m=1 means they must sell their current house

Households receive stochastic income every period

$$y_t = f\left(a_t\right) y_t^p y_t^{tr}$$

where $f(a_t)$ is a deterministic age profile, y_t^p is a permanent stochastic component, and y_t^{tr} is a transitory component

Model Setup: Household's Problem

$$E_{\tau} \left[\sum_{t=\tau}^{\tau+T-a_{\tau}} \beta^{t} \left[(1-D_{t}) \ u(c_{t}, s_{t}(h_{t})) + (D_{t}-D_{t-1}) \ v^{b}(w_{t}) \right] \right]$$

s.t.

$$c_t + (1+\psi)p_t(h_t) = w_t + \mathbf{1}_{[h_t = h_{t-1}\&m_{t=0}]}\nu p_t(h_{t-1}) + b_t$$

$$w_t = (1 - \tau) y_t + p_t(h_{t-1})(1 - \nu) - (1 - \tau) (R_{t-1} + \rho_{t-1} \mathbf{1}_{\{b_{t-1} > 0\}}) b_{t-1}$$

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 $b_t \le (1 - \delta_t) p_t(h_t)$ $y_t = f(a_t) y_t^p y_t^{tr}$

Model Setup: Equilibrium

- Given age, current house price, income (current and future), expected future house prices, interest rate, spread, moving shock, agent max utility ⇒ h^{*}_t(p_t; a_t, y^p_t, w_t)
- Aggregate housing demand using joint distribution of (a_t, y^p_t, w_t)

Equilibrium is given by

$$\Pr\left(h_{t}^{*}\left(p_{t};a_{t},y_{t}^{p},w_{t}\right)\leq h\right)\leq G_{t}\left(h\right)$$

where the RHS is quality distribution in time t

Calibration: All Inputs

1. Preferences and Technology

(Parameters fixed throughout all experiments.)

- (a) Felicity u, bequest function v, discount factor β
- (b) conditional distributions of death and moving shocks
- (c) conditional distribution of income
- (d) maintenance costs ψ , transaction costs ν
- (e) service flow function (relative to trend)
- 2. Distributions of house qualities and mover characteristics
- 3. Credit market conditions
 - (a) current and expected future values for the interest rate R and the spread ρ

- (b) current and expected future values for the downpayment constraint δ
- 4. House price expectations

Calibration: Utility, Income, Housing Service, Price Expectations

$$u(c,s) = \frac{[c^{1-\rho} s^{\rho}]^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}$$

Permanent income shock and housing service:

$$y_t^p = y_{t-1}^p \exp\left(\mu + \eta_t\right)$$

$$s_{t+1}(h) = \exp\left(\mu\right) s_t(h).$$

Price expectations:

$$p_{t+1}(h) = p_t(h) \exp(\mu + u_{t+1}(h))$$

Initial price function $p_0(h)$ and service function $s_0(h)$ are parameterized as shape-preserving cubic splines (to be estimated)

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Estimate Price and House Service Flow

Using the "calibrated" model, the initial price function $p_0(h)$ and service function $s_0(h)$ could be estimated using housing market clearing condition

The estimation method is minimize the distance between empirical CDF of demand for house quality (implied by the consumer's problem) and calculated CDF of quality distribution for transacted houses

This exercise is repeated for 2000 and 2005 with different set of parameter values. The estimated price distribution is then compared with the one from data

Results: Service Flow Concave in Quality



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Results: Changes in House Price: 2000-2005



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Results: Equilibrium Assignment



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Results: Equilibrium Assignment II

		D	ata	-		Ν	lodel	
House quality bins	Ι	п	Ш	IV	Ι	П	Ш	IV
PANEL A: YEAR 200	0							
Median Income (in thou	isands)							
aged < 35 years	48.5	68.7	88.1	128.5	38.3	67.6	100.3	206.3
· - ·	(1.8)	(2.5)	(4.0)	(7.1)				
aged > 35 years	44.0	63.4	90.3	152.3	33.4	67.4	95.9	182.2
0 . ,	(2.2)	(2.3)	(4.5)	(8.5)				
Median Cash (wealth p	lus incon	ne, in the	usands)					
aged < 35 years	112.0	169.7	284.6	646.8	93.2	158.5	361.9	1,551.4
· - ·	(5.4)	(7.8)	(15.3)	(39.7)				
aged > 35 years	172.3	284.8	496.4	1,141.8	122.9	241.1	547.1	1,721.0
	(9.2)	(15.4)	(27.6)	(71.5)				
Percentiles of the Cash	Distribu	tion (in t	housands)				
bottom 10%	60.2	94.9	146.0	310.9	59.6	114.5	221.0	763.0
top 10%	471.1	721.8	1,44 3.9	3,941.9	205.6	362.5	1,007.1	4,378.9

TABLE 3: ASSIGNMENT OF HOUSE QUALITIES IN DATA AND MODEL

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Results: Equilibrium Assignment III

PANEL B: YEAR 2005

Median Income (in th	ousands)							
aged ≤ 35 years	61.3	73.6	101.9	132.5	51.0	82.0	115.7	137.4
	(4.0)	(3.5)	(8.1)	(7.1)				
${ m aged}>35~{ m years}$	45.9	78.5	91.7	144.7	35.7	76.4	96 .8	244.6
	(4.3)	(4.9)	(5.7)	(12.5)				
Median Cash (wealth	plus incor	ne, in tho	usands)					
aged ≤ 35 years	203.4	258.5	421.3	735.2	136.7	238.6	526.0	1,689.8
	(18.0)	(22.5)	(43.8)	(76.4)				
${ m aged}>35~{ m years}$	251.6	459.7	712.2	1,645.6	196.3	360.6	749.3	2,601.8
	(29.5)	(45.2)	(70.9)	(187.7)				
Percentiles of the Cas	h Distribu	tion (in t	housands)				
bottom 10%	79.1	125.3	180.4	391.3	67.0	146.5	314.9	1,093.0
top 10%	714.4	1,099.0	1,733.7	5,582.6	324.8	553.8	1,244.4	6,262.4

Results: Equilibrium Assignment IIII

TABLE 4: HOUSING WEALTH RELATIVE TO CASH (WEALTH PLUS INCOME)

	Age							
	below 35	35-50 years	50-65 years	above 65				
Panel A: Year 2000								
Data	0.632	0.459	0.369	0.317				
Model	0.613	0.435	0.385	0.403				
Panel B: Year 2005								
Data	0.968	0.677	0.317	0.387				
Model	0.959	0.627	0.423	0.522				

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Results: Cross Section of Capital Gains



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